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Abstract Sudden Oak Death has been impacting Cali-
fornia’s coastal forests for more than a decade. In that time,
and in the absence of a centrally organized and coordinated
set of mandatory management actions for this disease in
California’s wildlands and open spaces, many local com-
munities have initiated their own management programs.
We present ﬁve case studies to explore how local-level
management has attempted to control this disease. From
these case studies, we glean three lessons: connections
count, scale matters, and building capacity is crucial. These
lessons may help management, research, and education
planning for future pest and disease outbreaks.
Keywords Local management 
Participatory management  Capacity building 
Forest health  Forest pest management 
Non-native/invasive species  Sudden Oak Death
Introduction
Landscape managers of urban and wildland forests have
long understood that eradication of a new pest is practi-
cable only in the early stages of a given outbreak, before
the pest population builds to an uncontrollable or
widespread level (Council for Agricultural Science and
Technology 2003; Waring and O’Hara 2005). It is espe-
cially hard to attempt plant disease control when the dis-
ease has a latent or incubation period that allows the causal
pathogen to become well-established before it is detectable
(Gilligan 2008), as in the case of Sudden Oak Death in
California and Oregon. What management options, then,
are available when the point of eradication opportunity is
well past? As forest health educators, we work with land
managers, homeowners, and policy-makers to address this
issue as it relates to Phytophthora ramorum, the cause of
Sudden Oak Death. For an actively spreading epidemic
disease like Sudden Oak Death, in which eradication is
impracticable in some areas but might still be effective in
others, it may be helpful to review management actions
throughout the range of the disease to highlight the effective
disease work that is occurring, recognize its limitations, and
provide context for the applicability of these approaches as
a model for working with future pest outbreaks.
Sudden Oak Death ﬁrst appeared in California in the
mid 1990s, but reaction to the disease reached a fever pitch
in 2000 when large numbers of oaks were seen dying in
coastal counties from no known cause. We now know that
Sudden Oak Death is caused by an exotic microorganism,
P. ramorum, which genetic evidence strongly suggests
came into California on the leaves of imported nursery
plants (Ivors and others 2006; Mascheretti and others
2008). In North America, this pathogen is currently found
in the forests of 14 California counties, in the forests of one
county in Oregon, and on plant stock within the nursery
trade. For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus
only on the forest infestations in California, where Sudden
Oak Death is found in forests and wildlands managed by a
wide variety of public and private entities and is generally
well established.
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was unknown, and there were fears that the mysterious
epidemic might spread to more trees or throughout the rest
of the state. These concerns prompted quick local action
and a call for additional assistance at higher government
levels. Nationally, the USDA Forest Service has adminis-
tered almost $30 million in P. ramorum research funding
and in education and management grants since the begin-
ning of the epidemic (Government Accountability Ofﬁce
2006; K. Britton, USDA Forest Service, personal com-
munication, June 2008). Within California, the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection oversaw an
initial $3.8 million in state funding in 2002, but California
has not provided funding to address this disease since then
(California Oak Mortality Task Force 2008). Additionally,
the non-proﬁt California Oak Mortality Task Force
(COMTF; described below) works within California and
assists nationally to coordinate education and management
recommendations for P. ramorum and Sudden Oak Death.
Sudden Oak Death has severely impacted plant com-
munities on public (e.g., Los Padres National Forest, Point
Reyes National Seashore, Muir Woods National Monu-
ment, several state and county parks), quasi-public (e.g.,
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, Marin Muni-
cipal Water District, Mid-Peninsula Regional Open Space
District, Kashia Reservation), and private lands. The dis-
ease’s wide and patchy distribution has proven problematic
for management and control decisions. By the time the
causal pathogen was identiﬁed and named, it was too well-
established in and around the greater San Francisco Bay
area to warrant the kinds of eradication attempts that have
since been made in Oregon, where land managers can still
enumerate and treat individual infected trees each year
(Goheen and others 2004; Kanaskie and others 2006;
Hansen and others 2008). Rigorously-applied silvicultural
measures, similar to the Oregon eradication regime, could
potentially slow disease spread at the fringes of the Cali-
fornia infestation; however, the state and federal regulatory
agencies with jurisdiction over private California forest-
lands have declined to attempt such efforts. These agencies
have refrained from following Oregon’s lead because they
interpret the scope of their responsibilities to pertain only
to commercial forestry activities, non-forestry agriculture,
activities directly affecting wildlife, or activities directly
affecting water quality, with no agency claiming lead
responsibility for overall forestland protection. Thus, con-
tinued spread is likely, especially in Mendocino, Hum-
boldt, and Del Norte Counties, where plant community
types and precipitation regimes are favorable to pathogen
establishment (Meentemeyer and others 2004, 2008).
Scientiﬁcally-tested recommendations for managing
forests impacted by P. ramorum are still in development,
although at least three promising directions have emerged:
application of systemic fungicides (Garbelotto and Schmidt
2009), forest thinning to remove susceptible hosts (Vala-
chovic and others 2008), and targeted removal of the main
carrier, California bay laurel, near coast live oak trees
(Swiecki and Bernhardt 2008). However, uncertainty about
effective management actions remains.
Into this absence of deﬁnitive management direction
have stepped a variety of concerned groups working at
many scales, from individual neighborhoods to county
government staff to regional and statewide collaborations.
Some of these groups are socially based neighborhood
communities in the familiar sense, while others are more
formally deﬁned professional organizations of practitio-
ners, groups of politicians, or tribes; some are longstanding
and others ad hoc. While the overarching infrastructure
provided by federal funds and agencies has been crucial to
the support of these organizations’ activities and to the
scientiﬁc development of experimental treatments, the
motivation and focus on action has come from this ground
level. The value of the following case studies lies in their
illustration of such groups’ effectiveness at serving their
wider communities during new pest outbreaks by bridging
this gap between centrally-directed control actions and the
development of scientiﬁcally proven management inter-
ventions for individual landowners.
Theoretical Context and Methodology
These case studies did not emerge from an objective
methodology. Rather, they represent nine years of personal
experience with the development of Sudden Oak Death in
California. This paper seeks to review and learn from
shared, observed experience rather than to test predeter-
mined hypotheses against collected data—although there is
ample need and scope for the latter. Our perspective is
twofold: we have provided individual and community-level
assistance and education related to Sudden Oak Death
throughout its range in California, and we have participated
in designing and implementing experiments to help
develop recommendations for practical treatment of the
disease at a variety of scales. Working within these roles
has given us a more comprehensive, synoptic understand-
ing of the management, research, and education activities
related to Sudden Oak Death than is available to most
individual researchers or managers or larger, more distant
government agencies. This bottom-up approach to infor-
mation-sharing and management recommendation was
recently and explicitly recommended in an opinion by
Smith and others (2009).
We further augmented personal observations with media
reports and discussions with colleagues. Then we compiled
a number of case studies of how speciﬁc groups addressed
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123their own particular Sudden Oak Death issues, and we
submitted these case studies for factual review by the
players themselves and by the scientists who have studied
P. ramorum in California since its discovery. In this way,
our narratives represent the collective observations of a
scientiﬁc and educational community working to under-
stand and manage this emerging forest disease. We ulti-
mately combined different story lines to create ﬁve case
studies that highlight consistent, local-level management
approaches to Sudden Oak Death within California (see
Fig. 1).
Our analysis of the case studies below does not try to
determine the ‘‘right’’ or ‘‘wrong’’ treatment strategy for
forests impacted by Sudden Oak Death in California.
Instead, we share how these cases comment on the litera-
ture of local action in the face of threats to the natural
environment.
The case studies examine this action in the instance of
Sudden Oak Death, comparing the local responses we have
observed at many scales against some common social
theories of community involvement, and comparing man-
agement of this particular forest pest against other threats
to wildland systems. From this comparison, we extract
three lessons that suggest that local management responses
to epidemic outbreaks of forest pathogens and insect pests
may be structured at a deep level by a variety of charac-
teristics shared by local groups. We also suggest that if
these characteristics are taken into account and worked
with, the apparent ‘‘randomness’’ of local-level manage-
ment can be incorporated into more concerted, larger-scale
efforts as well as into attempts to more accurately model
the spread of a pest or pathogen.
Social scientists have extensively analyzed the condi-
tions underlying local organization and action, including
that related to the natural environment. Tilly (1973) pro-
posed socioeconomic and sociopolitical criteria that are
necessary for such action, including the following: sufﬁ-
cient economic resources within the local group to gain
attention to the problem of concern; a focus on close,
common physical surroundings rather than wide geo-
graphic dispersal of group members; and the perception
that the group does not yet have a voice in the management
of the problem. Michaels and others (2006) suggested that
‘‘focusing events,’’ deﬁned as sudden events that have the
potential to cause harm, are often necessary to catalyze
group formation and action. Flint and Luloff (2007),
focusing speciﬁcally on forest pest outbreaks, theorize that
communities are most likely to act to preserve the forest
environment from large-scale disturbance when the com-
munity perceives itself to be greatly at risk from such
disturbance and when it has sufﬁcient internal ‘‘interac-
tional capacity,’’ or sufﬁciently organized and developed
social relationships, to respond adequately. On the basis of
survey data, Flint and Luloff (2007) also conclude, coun-
terintuitively, that communities respond more readily to
broad-based ecological threats than to immediate threats.
In some ways, the threat of invasive organism spread
into communities resembles the threat of wildland ﬁre. Fire
scientists and ﬁre management professionals have invested
increasing amounts of time and energy in recent years to
understand how local dynamics can facilitate or impede the
implementation of fuels treatments and other ﬁrewise
actions in the wildland-urban interface (e.g., Brunson and
Schindler 2004; Carroll and others 2004, 2006; Cheng and
Becker 2005; Brooks and others 2006; Edwards and others
2008). This research often highlights the diversity of
communities with different ways of solving problems
(Cheng and Becker 2005; Brooks and others 2006) and
recommends that ﬁre management professionals adopt a
similar diversity of community-generated deﬁnitions of
‘‘success’’ rather than expecting a uniﬁed result across all
communities (Brooks and others 2006). When wildﬁres
give rise to community conﬂict, this is often because extra-
local authorities respond to emergencies by trying to
impose an efﬁcient solution that is resisted by locals whose
practices are embedded in social or spiritual values rather
Fig. 1 Locations of California communities referred to in case
studies
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2006). These ﬁndings are supported by other writing about
natural resources management that in general favorably
reviews public, participatory management over private,
technocratic management and decentralized management
over centralized management (Gale and Miller 1985;
Moote and McClaran 1997; Lane 1998; Mascarenhas and
Scarce 2004; Keough and Blahna 2005; Lejano and others
2007; Rist and others 2007; Higgins and Duane 2008).
This enhanced understanding of the diversity of com-
munity values and the sources of community resistance to
some forms of management has led to a strong recent focus
on collaborative learning and citizen science. The growing
trend of citizen science, or using volunteers to collect data,
conduct monitoring, and perform repetitive scientiﬁc sup-
port tasks, has been reviewed positively for its power to
efﬁciently contribute to pure science (Cohn 2008; Delaney
and others 2008; Howard and Davis 2009; Sullivan 2009).
In terms of a more applied science such as wildland ﬁre
management, Cheng and Becker (2005) emphasize that
collaborative learning fosters the productive relationships
between communities and professional natural resource
managers that are necessary for sustained community ﬁre
protection over the long term. Shared learning within the
community—not just between the community and outside
professionals—is important too. One prerequisite of suc-
cessful community-based management is that the com-
munity members reach a ‘‘shared cognition’’ about the
goals of management, so that everyone is on the same page
(Gass and others 2009). Pretty (2003) ﬁnds community
management a promising solution to the problem of
managing the commons, although he points out that
community organization can have a dark side if the com-
munity’s shared cognition sanctions harm to natural
resources.
‘‘Local’’ Response
Much of the foregoing literature uses the term ‘‘commu-
nity’’ for a variety of social and spatial groupings existing
for a wide variety of purposes. The concept’s malleability
has subjected its use to criticism by Kumar (2005) and Flint
and others (2008), for example, who contend that the word
is too vague as a reliable guide for analysis unless it is
explicitly theorized for the particular analysis. We have
tried to stick to using the word ‘‘local’’ for the scale of
action we are describing in the case studies here. We rec-
ognize that ‘‘local’’ is potentially vulnerable to some of the
same criticisms as ‘‘community.’’ However, unlike ‘‘com-
munity,’’ the use of ‘‘local’’ carries no pretense of preci-
sion, instead being generally understood by what it is not
(in our intended sense, that which is not ‘‘global,’’ ‘‘fed-
eral,’’ or ‘‘state’’). It is precisely the ﬂexibility of scale
implied by this word that we are trying to highlight in these
case studies.
The case studies presented below range over the gamut
of possible senses of ‘‘local.’’ At one end of the spectrum,
we include a consortium of concerned citizens, policy-
makers, and scientists (the California Oak Mortality Task
Force) that, in its size and in the existence of coordinating
staff, resembles an NGO to some extent. At the other end,
we include true local communities in the sense commended
by Flint and others (2008): groups of people motivated by
concern for a common place, for common resources, for
common management goals, or for common ideals. In
between, we include some actors with governmental roles,
including individual tribes and county governments. What
unites these disparate groups under the rubric of the
‘‘local’’ is that they stand apart from the two groups that
have traditionally played the main roles in public pest and
disease management: (1) large-scale federal or state gov-
ernment agencies and (2) academic scientists housed in
institutions with national or statewide reach. These are the
groups who typically impose the efﬁcient, technocratic
environmental management solutions of which Carroll and
others (2006) write. Although some of the local groups in
our case studies may contain individual representatives
from each of these larger levels, there are important dif-
ferences between the two levels. The groups highlighted
here are smaller in scale, more ad hoc, and more informal;
they are not individuals; and they have coalesced around
common interests.
Unlike state and federal government agencies, county/
tribal governments and individual agency employees lack
the capacity for unilaterally imposing the region-wide
insect and disease management efforts that may be neces-
sary for complete eradication or control. Unlike academic
scientists per se, many of the groups we discuss are moti-
vated by attachment to a speciﬁc place or region. Unlike
most NGOs, the COMTF does not implement actions;
instead, it creates the preconditions for effective action by
assembling information and coordinating the dissemination
of scientiﬁc knowledge. We call all of these groups ‘‘local’’
for lack of a better word to characterize the proactive
nature of their actions absent a similar proactive response
from better-resourced state and local governments.
‘‘Effective’’ Response
Local responses to forest insect and disease threats are
necessarily limited in scale (Gass and others 2009) and
rarely extensive enough across the landscape to adequately
respond to an epidemic (Holdenrieder and others 2004;
Gilligan 2008). However, rather than viewing these efforts
through the lens of biological insufﬁciency, it is possible to
view them in the positive light of community capacity
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123development and of citizen science. Thus, ‘‘effective’’
disease management can have more than one meaning.
Most of the local management efforts detailed in these case
studies are not effective in the sense of eradicating
P. ramorum or slowing its spread on a large scale. How-
ever, they are effective in the sense of alleviating pathogen
impacts on a smaller scale; in stimulating local involve-
ment with natural resource management; in enhancing
group capacities for useful citizen science by providing
testing-grounds for new management techniques; and in
preparing for more effective pest outbreak responses in the
future.
Many formal and informal retrospective analyses of
community responses to disease and insect outbreaks have
been performed. Some of these (e.g., Cannon and Worley
1980; Anagnostakis 1997; Gottwald and others 2002)
concentrate on economic or biological factors relative to
treatment effectiveness, while others (e.g., Parkins and
McKendrick 2007; Flint and others 2008) focus on com-
munity vulnerability, resilience, capacity development, and
sociopolitical responses to large-scale forest disturbance.
The following case studies and analysis contribute to this
literature in two ways: ﬁrst, by the lessons we can draw to
inform future responses, and second, by highlighting the
role that this local management plays as a necessary
adjunct to scientiﬁc investigation of disease management.
Case Studies: Local-Level Disease Management
in California
Case Study: Local Initiative Leads to Statewide
Leadership and Coordination
Beginning in the mid 1990s, the University of California
Cooperative Extension (UCCE) in Marin County received
a barrage of calls and requests for help from homeowners
with dying oak trees. Large numbers of dead trees were
also prompting concern among local ﬁre ofﬁcials. As the
problem intensiﬁed across the county, it was clear that
some action was required, even though the cause of the tree
mortality was still unknown. A Marin County Supervisor,
Cynthia Murray, took the lead and tasked a key group of
county departments with creating a working group to
address the issue. Then, in January 2000, the Marin County
Board of Supervisors ofﬁcially supported the formation of
a local Marin County Oak Mortality Task Force. The ﬁrst
Marin task force meeting took place soon after with over
75 attendees, including representatives from public agen-
cies, elected ofﬁcials, landscape professionals, and several
interested UC researchers.
Especially in the beginning of the Sudden Oak Death
epidemic, funding was needed to support the huge public
demand for information and technical assistance. UCCE
Marin and Marin County Supervisor Murray worked to
obtain $15,000 from the local county government and an
additional $20,000 from a local foundation to fund out-
reach efforts. They also launched a publicity campaign to
alert the press and gain attention to their cause. This
allowed for the dissemination of information beyond just
the locally affected neighborhoods in the county to other
parts of the state beginning to experience a similar
situation.
Then, shortly after the cause of Sudden Oak Death was
conﬁrmed in the summer of 2000, the California Depart-
ment of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) and the Cali-
fornia Forest Pest Council formed the California Oak
Mortality Task Force (COMTF). The timing was more than
coincidental. Over the course of several previous months,
the two different groups had been exchanging phone calls
and coordinating their next actions. Though the groups
agreed to join forces and focus speciﬁcally on Sudden Oak
Death, tensions and uncertainty as to the causal agent of the
disease led them to compromise on the more general phrase
of ‘‘Oak Mortality’’ in the Task Force name rather than
highlighting any speciﬁc cause.
In November of that same year, Marin County Super-
visor Cynthia Murray convened the ﬁrst Sudden Oak Death
Summit to bring together a wider range of concerned cit-
izens and policymakers from every level of government.
Sixty lobbyists, legislators and local decision makers from
the then six affected counties (Marin, Sonoma, Napa, Santa
Cruz, San Mateo, and Monterey) attended. At that session,
Governor Gray Davis announced $100,000 for the Oak
Mortality Task Force and Under Secretary of Agriculture
Jim Lyons showed federal commitment via an $800,000
pledge and a request for $2.4 million in additional federal
funds for Sudden Oak Death.
This recognition and funding bolstered the goal of
moving Sudden Oak Death from a local cause to an issue of
state and national importance. As a subcommittee of the
non-proﬁt Pest Council, the COMTF could not lobby for
funding but could provide technical assistance and advice.
One of the most important tasks COMTF members initially
were called upon to do was to compile a document to
inform legislators of prioritized research, policy, education
and management needs. Indeed, in 2001, four state legis-
lators proposed Sudden Oak Death bills to address the issue
in California.
It soon became clear that forests were not the only
impacted systems when the ﬁrst U.S. nursery was found
infested in December 2000 (California Oak Mortality Task
Force 2008). From the beginning, the COMTF played a
large role in providing information to support the creation
of regulations and quarantines to contain P. ramorum, and
the role of the nurseries in potentially spreading the
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Having provided assistance to state regulators initially,
COMTF was then able to assist federal regulators in
quickly reacting to infestations in national, wholesale
nurseries a few years later.
The policy recommendations supplied by the COMTF
are deemed especially valuable because they come from a
consensus-driven process. The COMTF has grown to
encompass over 80 agencies and more than 1,000 members
and actively seeks to include input from public agencies,
non-proﬁt organizations, and private interests. Lead
researchers act as Science Advisors so that the COMTF has
access to the latest scientiﬁc ﬁndings and can quickly
translate them to management recommendations. All of
these efforts help ensure that policymakers, land managers,
and homeowners have access to the latest science, and that
it is vetted by a diverse group of experts before bearing any
stamp of approval. This multi-agency, coordinated
approach has been highlighted as a model for response to
future outbreaks (National Association of State Foresters
2004). While the COMTF has no regulatory authority or
management mandates, it provides a vital role in bringing
together smaller players at various agencies and throughout
different regions of the state. In this way, both the early
Marin task force and the larger California body act to focus
and expand the interests and efforts of local individuals.
Case Study: Activism and Management at the County
Level
Disease levels in Sonoma County remained relatively low
through the ﬁrst 5 years of the Sudden Oak Death epidemic
in California. However, in 2006, tree mortality exploded in
the forests in western Sonoma County, especially around
the Russian River corridor. Homeowners were not able to
keep up with the increasing number of dead tanoaks
needing removal in the forests surrounding their homes and
looked to the County and other government agencies for
assistance. A COMTF-sponsored public meeting in
Guerneville in 2006 turned confrontational as landowners
demanded to know why nothing was being done about the
piles of dead tanoaks in the steep, forested canyons where
they lived.
Energized individuals began an aggressive letter-writing
campaign to neighbors, newspapers, and elected ofﬁcials,
demanding action be taken. In response, Sonoma County
agencies convened local, state and federal ofﬁcials to
appeal for assistance in addressing the concerns of affected
homeowners. The USDA Forest Service provided funds to
the Sonoma County Department of Emergency Services
and UCCE Sonoma County ofﬁces to respond. With a grant
of approximately $150,000, two temporary staff positions
were funded to write a strategic response plan for the
County and to conduct public outreach on the issue. A
Technical Advisory Group was also convened to advise
and coordinate management efforts.
Twenty-two community meetings were held throughout
the county in 2007, directly reaching over 870 people. The
Sonoma County Sudden Oak Death Strategic Response
Plan, presented to the Sonoma County Board of Supervi-
sors in January 2008, addressed the following issues: cur-
rent and potential P. ramorum infection throughout the
county; risks and effects of the disease; the impacts of tree
mortality on ﬁre behavior; and current and future require-
ments of local and state agencies to deal with spread and
mortality issues (Bell and others 2008). In response, the
Board gave Sudden Oak Death and ﬁre management a
higher budgetary priority within the County budget and
continued to seek avenues of funding for dealing with
issues pertaining to Sudden Oak Death.
In the meantime, with assistance from the coordinating
staff, Fire Safe Sonoma, a non-proﬁt ﬁre prevention orga-
nization, obtained grant funding for two projects speciﬁc to
helping homeowners deal with tree mortality related to
P. ramorum. First, with a grant from Paciﬁc Gas & Electric
Co. that was augmented with labor donated by Davey Tree
Service, Fire Safe Sonoma launched a chipper program for
neighborhoods impacted by Sudden Oak Death. This
partnership between homeowners and tree care companies
provides some ﬁnancial assistance to homeowners in order
for them to reduce the fuel volume near their homes,
thereby also reducing ﬁre risk for the surrounding area.
Additionally, the Bureau of Land Management funded
Fire Safe Sonoma to implement the Sonoma County Sud-
den Oak Death Fuels Mitigation and Defensible Space
Project. This project will aid homeowners who are faced
with the expensive challenge of creating the required 100
feet of home-surrounding Defensible Space in areas where
Sudden Oak Death has killed many trees. The project is in
the early implementation stages, and is anticipated to be
successful (C. Safford, Sonoma County Department of
Emergency Services, personal communication, June 2009).
However, demand from homeowners requesting help con-
tinues to outstrip funding available to help them.
Case Study: Monitoring for Early-Stage Disease
on Large Forested Landscapes
The Hoopa and Yurok Reservations in northern Hum-
boldt County contain large areas of tanoak, and these
tribes expressed great concern about the possibility that
P. ramorum could decimate culturally important stands of
trees on their reservations. The affected tanoak trees not
only are key traditional food sources for the tribe but are
also viewed as sacred trees; other culturally important
plants are also hosts for the pathogen. While the pathogen
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County, the forest infestation only ﬁfty miles away in the
southern part of the county makes the threat of infection
great. In cooperation with UCCE and the UC Davis
Rizzo Lab, the Hoopa and Yurok reservations agreed to
participate in a watercourse monitoring network aimed at
early detection of P. ramorum in streams, the ﬁrst places
that the pathogen is detectable in watersheds. Because of
their intense concern for preserving both speciﬁc tanoak
groves and the culturally important tanoak resource in
general, tribal forestry managers saw watercourse moni-
toring as a way to get the earliest possible signal that
trees may be infected with P. ramorum, enabling them to
implement any road closures, stepped-up educational
programs, or host removal measures as quickly as
possible.
The Hoopa and Yurok reservations worked with UCCE
and UC Davis to pinpoint the largest and most frequently
visited streams in the reservations and receive training on
how to conduct the monitoring programs themselves. Once
forestry staff were trained in the stream baiting procedures,
they began to implement the monitoring with their own
people. Although the pathogen has not yet been recovered
from reservation land, tribal forestry managers and UC
staff are conﬁdent that, along with the rest of their exten-
sive watercourse monitoring network in place throughout
northwest California, should the pathogen reach the res-
ervations, observers will detect it at an early stage, giving
them the widest number of options for proactive disease
management.
Case Study: Cooperative Strategies Among Small
Landowners
The traditional gathering grounds and 40-acre reservation
of the Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are in the heart of
P. ramorum-infested forests in western Sonoma County.
Once it was clear that Sudden Oak Death was impacting
their lands, the tribe’s main concerns were to (1) limit
further spread of the pathogen on gathered plants; (2)
manage hazard trees near buildings on the reservation; and
(3) attempt to protect uninfected tanoak on the reservation.
After the USDA Forest Service and COMTF ﬁrst spoke
with Kashia tribal members and staff in fall 2003, in 2005
the State and Private Forestry division of the Forest Service
agreed to provide approximately $20,000 to the Kashia for
managing Sudden Oak Death on their lands. The tribe then
contracted with private and university researchers to study
a preventative treatment; tribal staff and researchers
worked closely with neighboring properties to lay out plots
and monitor the research. The treatments included spraying
susceptible tanoak trees with a phosphonate compound
(Garbelotto and Schmidt 2009), while sanitation efforts
included education about symptoms on commonly col-
lected plants and steps to disinfect shoes and equipment.
Additionally, over the course of six years, the Kashia were
able to improve safety on the Rancheria by removing
approximately 25 hazard trees.
Also in 2005, a gardening group from Portola Valley
(a small, forested community along the peninsula south of
San Francisco) requested a presentation from the COMTF
to explain the increased mortality they were seeing close to
their homes. The garden meeting audience was at capacity
and included a staff member from the Town of Portola
Valley, who then took the information and sense of
urgency back to the town administration. Over the course
of the next year, there were an additional nine Sudden Oak
Death community meetings and workshops throughout San
Mateo and adjoining Santa Clara County. After each small
town-hall style presentation, homeowners and local leaders
began working together to address the issues facing their
communities.
Farther south, in the steep, ﬁre-prone canyons of Big
Sur, homeowners worked with their local Fire Safe
Council, volunteer Fire Brigades, and county and state
agencies to remove dead trees from the defensible space
around structures. This coordinated effort resulted not only
in funding (through fundraising and grants) but also in
regulatory allowances to ease the permitting process for
tree removals. And across the greater San Francisco Bay
Area, Homeowners Associations facilitated cooperation
amongst individual homeowners to receive preventative
treatments in bulk from tree care professionals. Many
additional communities also participated in research ini-
tiatives to better map and thus manage the disease on a
smaller, community scale through the ‘‘Sudden Oak Death
Blitz’’ program led by Matteo Garbelotto of UC Berkeley.
In each of these cases, different landowners and interest
groups came together to treat and manage large areas of
private land at once, which not only provided ﬁnancial
savings to individual homeowners but also beneﬁtted the
overall community by protecting forest growing across
multiple ownerships. There was no guarantee that all
affected homeowners would participate, and to be sure,
there was not 100% participation in these community
efforts. However, for the individuals who did participate,
they did gain a ﬁnancial advantage by partnering with their
neighbors, which likely allowed for more land to be pro-
tected than if each homeowner worked alone. This group
participation also moved action toward a positive
momentum where neighbors were encouraged to work
together rather than opting out of the work because it only
affected their property or bottom line.
Though these community efforts often occur on a
neighborhood-by-neighborhood level, the cumulative
effect across the scale of the entire state is greater.
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unintended, consequences of tribal involvement with
Sudden Oak Death is the personal connection that tribes
have brought to tanoak mortality. While some western
foresters, landowners, and land managers minimize the
threat of Sudden Oak Death by pointing out that forests are
generally overstocked with tanoak, the Kashia and others
speak passionately about the importance of tanoaks to the
forests and their way of life. The high degree of access that
neighbors gave the Kashia to conduct their experiments is a
testament to this positive effect.
Case Study: Adaptive Management on Mid-Sized
Public Lands
In 2003, the Mid-Peninsula Regional Open Space District
(MROSD) was looking for guidance on best management
practices (BMPs) to keep P. ramorum from spreading from
already infested preserves to uninfested areas under its
management. While the San Francisco Bay Area counties
the District occupies (San Mateo and Santa Clara) were
regulated zones for the pathogen, no restrictions were in
place inside the regulated area to limit the spread of the
pathogen on a more local level. Since the District was
considering asking their public visitors to take sanitation
measures to reduce pathogen spread, resource management
personnel felt it was important for the staff and crews to
also be consistent with this request when it came to sani-
tation and BMPs.
Phytophthora ramorum had ﬁrst been conﬁrmed on
MROSD lands in October 2000. Although there had been
informal discussions about preventing the spread of
P. ramorum, nothing had been formally written, and there
was a lot of uncertainty about which practices were the
most effective. After reviewing other BMPs created for
general audiences, MROSD realized that it needed to cre-
ate its own set of best practices that could be more easily
understood by its staff and were generally consistent with
its standard work practices. Given the many uncertainties
surrounding Sudden Oak Death and the lack of hard sci-
ence to support many of the proposed sanitation measures,
however, staff understandably expressed some resistance
and skepticism to taking unproven actions which would
interfere with usual work practices.
Nonetheless, MROSD felt it needed to be a leader in
reducing the local spread of the pathogen within and
among its preserves. Taking the best available science at
the time, resource managers focused on the activities that
seemed to have the greatest spread risk and crafted man-
agement responses intended not only to slow pathogen
spread but also to meet other District goals. Measures
included cleaning equipment, such as trucks, chainsaws,
and boots, between infested and non-infested parcels. After
the program began, ﬁeld crews agreed that the BMPs were
worthwhile and not as difﬁcult to implement as they had
feared. One staff member even commented that chainsaws
were working better because Sudden Oak Death require-
ments that they be cleaned more often resulted in their also
being lubricated more often. MROSD also found that the
reach of the P. ramorum BMPs extended beyond Sudden
Oak Death: the sanitation measures implemented also
related to invasive weed seeds and other general land
management issues.
In addition to their willingness to proactively implement
management activities in the absence of complete certainty
as to their effectiveness, MROSD has also played an
important role by leveraging resources. Simply put, their
active involvement allowed additional funding and
resources to ﬂow into research on managing P. ramorum in
wildlands. Other nearby land management agencies, such
as the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, have
since joined this large-scale ‘‘experiment’’ in managing
wildlands and have brought their own staff and funding to
the table. Even private landowners who are dealing with
parcels in the tens of acres are willing to jump in with land,
time, and money to try these untested management tech-
niques in an effort to both save their local trees and con-
tribute to the larger understanding of successful wildland
management of the pathogen.
The experience of these management ‘‘pioneers’’ high-
lights a common management problem of needing to act
before scientiﬁc consensus has been reached. Their situa-
tion is typical in California, where infestations in already
heavily infested counties are not targeted for action. For the
MROSD, it made a huge local difference whether one
parcel was infected while a neighboring one was not, but
the coarser county-level view of the state and federal
agencies did not support this. This work also shows the
importance of building BMPs and treatment strategies from
the ground up and not trying to force a one-size-ﬁts-all
solution onto smaller, more local issues.
Discussion
The case studies above draw on at least ten different
management actions being taken against P. ramorum
across California. As mentioned earlier, the biological
effectiveness of these actions is equivocal, but they serve a
strong social purpose. The strength of these actions lies in
their close connection to actual problems and communities
on the ground; the weakness lies in their reliance on spe-
ciﬁc communities’ commitment to initiate and continue
these actions. From the case studies, we have extracted
three common lessons concerning local response to Sudden
Oak Death that help explain when and how a group pulled
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help predict how certain communities might react to the
environmental threats of the future.
Lesson #1: Connections Count
The experience of the Marin County community, which
quickly used its resources to muster an explosion of pub-
licity about Sudden Oak Death that attracted attention and
more resources, illustrates how a focusing event (Michaels
and others 2006) can catalyze the initiation of locally-
driven environmental management. However, the condi-
tions of this initiation, and of the local group’s ability to
sustain its efforts, depend upon a variety of factors. Mar-
shall and Jones (2005) note that wealthy and educated
people are most likely to participate in community natural
resources management activities. Afﬂuent, urbanized
neighborhoods discretely concentrated in space, such as in
Portola Valley, are more likely to have the social network,
time, money, and energy to get together to attempt inte-
grated disease management than relatively poorer neigh-
borhoods in, say, rural Sonoma County, where housing and
networks alike are widely dispersed. As another example,
one of the few integrated management plans to emerge in
California was written by the Santa Lucia Conservancy,
which manages large tracts of open space interspersed with
large private properties near the wealthy community of
Carmel. The development of this management plan was
made possible largely through the volunteered time and
energy of community landowners (C. McCormick, Santa
Lucia Conservancy, personal communication, February
2009).
Moreover, the success of afﬂuent communities like
Marin County at attracting funds and attention to a per-
ceived environmental problem suggests that success is not
only a matter of interested citizens bringing their personal
money to the table. Even more important is that these
citizens have the connections and the understanding of
civic processes (for example, the phone numbers of county
supervisors or how to deal with a city council agenda)
needed to attract the attention of the politicians, govern-
ment agencies, and nongovernmental organizations that
can access ﬁnancial resources in adequate amounts. The
relative absence of this political know-how does not pre-
vent management from happening; it just slows down the
management timeline. In the case of local groups like those
in Sonoma County, where the perception of an environ-
mental risk developed more slowly, by the time citizens did
become motivated to attract those organizations and
agencies they were willing to band together to more
effectively leverage available funds, such as the BLM fuels
reduction money, or to donate in-kind labor or money to
help deal with disease impacts.
Lesson #2: Scale Matters
Our case studies and other informal observations suggest
some differences between groups working to manage
Sudden Oak Death at the urban forest scale and those
working to manage it at a larger wildland scale. The urban
forest scale appears more spatially contained than the
wildland scale; properties in the urbanized setting are more
accessible and generally easier to work on; and the visual
landscape of the urban forest is less dense, promoting
collective monitoring of disease status. The scale of Cali-
fornia wildlands, on the other hand, can appear over-
whelming. Many private property owners in California
probably refrain from active management of their forest-
lands simply because they feel lost in a sea of vegetation
(see Megalos (2000) for documentation of this in North
Carolina). In non-urban forests, residents living far from
governmental centers either rely on their own knowledge
(Wear and Greis 2002) or receive help from organized
nongovernmental organizations such as watershed resto-
ration organizations, tribal organizations, ﬁre safe councils,
or extension agencies; this support is often suggested by
the organization rather than actively sought by the com-
munities themselves. The more urbanized the invaded
forest, the more likely property owners are to be ‘‘squeaky
wheels,’’ rather than relying on a go-it-alone, independent
management ethic.
This difference in scale and perception between urban
and rural forests helps explain some of the difference in
timing between the Marin County and Sonoma County
responses to Sudden Oak Death. Although the two counties
share a border and a reputation for urbane ‘‘Bay Area’’
lifestyles, large portions of Sonoma County are located in
the heavily forested, very rugged Coast Range. In these
remote rural areas, which are heavily impacted by SOD,
forest management issues are complex and multi-faceted.
Access and topographic constraints may limit awareness of
forest health issues for all but the most active landowners,
and these constraints certainly limit the available palette of
practical management tools. In Marin County, where peo-
ple could see the disease in their backyards and neigh-
borhood parks, a clear perception of a broad ecological
problem emerged early. Observant hikers and landowners
noticed the rapid death of trees along trails and in the
urbanized green space, motivating relatively swift com-
munication of the problem and expressions of concern
from active citizens. This supports the ideas of Flint and
Luloff (2007) about the value of this broad-based, eco-
logical community concern. However, in Sonoma County,
where residents are farther-ﬂung and the living experience
more rural, concern did not mount to the same degree until
the accumulating mortality near homesites presented a
clear and present ﬁre risk.
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depending on the nature, structure, and scale of the com-
munity’s forested environment. Rapid observation, risk
perception, and action in Marin County hinged on the
pathogen’s invasion of structured urban forests with spatial
elements that lend themselves to public participation and
observation, such as hiking trails, widely-spaced oak
woodlands, and neighborhood parks. In Sonoma County,
the pathogen was more likely to be found in dense Doug-
las-ﬁr/hardwood and redwood forests, in areas with steep
canyons, small private roads, limited access, and large
stretches of continuous vegetation. Even the public parks in
Sonoma County where the pathogen was found in the late
1990s are very large and relatively sparsely developed
(e.g., Annadel State Park, Armstrong Redwoods State
Natural Reserve, Austin Creek State Recreation Area, Jack
London State Historic Park).
This difference in scale also explains why the efforts of
the Hoopa and Yurok tribes to apply the most effective
early detection protocols across their large and rugged
landholdings are crucial to their hopes of preventing large-
scale P. ramorum invasion on their reservations. These
techniques can help the tribes’ land management staff—
whose technical training gives them an advantage over
neighborhood groups—to make up for the difﬁculties that
dense forests and difﬁcult topography put in the way of
detecting a microscopic pathogen.
Lesson #3: Building Capacity is Crucial
The groups who successfully implement local management
actions have in common an increased knowledge base and
better interactional capacity among themselves. Building
these competencies for other communities, or enhancing
them where they already exist, seem a way to empower
communities to take even more active roles in local man-
agement of Sudden Oak Death and other pests of the future.
Because of the importance of a community’s perception
of its risk, clear and non-technical explanations add great
value to the more technical risk assessments usually pro-
duced for new pest outbreaks. Interpreters of technical
information can play a crucial role in enlisting public
support for forest pest management efforts (Moser and
others 2009). In the case of Sudden Oak Death, the
COMTF plays a role in strengthening community-driven
efforts by supplying such non-technical interpretations of
relevant scientiﬁc ﬁndings through the development of
educational materials and by making a public information
ofﬁcer available for press releases and educational events.
As the Sonoma County example shows, it may be difﬁcult
for communities to appreciate P. ramorum as a broad-
based ecological threat to the forest as a whole. Because
the pathogen often produces inconspicuous and even
cryptic symptoms, communities generally become aware of
the problem only after it has escalated, making manage-
ment extremely expensive and more difﬁcult. Typically,
many people living within the distribution of Sudden Oak
Death are indignant about what they perceive as a lack of
effort by the scientiﬁc and land management community to
educate the public about the disease, despite the publicity
and extensive educational efforts it has inspired to date.
This makes the formulation of ever more innovative and
proactive outreach strategies imperative.
Additionally, the difﬁculty of perceiving Sudden Oak
Death as a broad threat is exacerbated by the low-value
status of the primary host to sustain lethal infections, tan-
oak. Owing to past management activities, coastal Cali-
fornia forests typically feature large numbers of small
tanoak trees that suffer from a variety of native disease and
insect pests which can help mask the initial symptoms of a
P. ramorum invasion (Baumgartner and Rizzo 2001;
J. Marshall, California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection, personal communication, August 2006). Addi-
tionally, and more importantly, tanoak trees have little
market value and compete with conifers for water and
sunlight, making them problematic in forests managed for
conifer timber. In such an atmosphere, it can be difﬁcult to
convince skeptical audiences of tanoak’s innate value, its
support of wildlife, its cultural value to Native tribes, or the
possibility that its disappearance from forests could cause
ecological harm in indirect ways. Even in Marin County,
concern sharply rose when coast live oaks, rather than
tanoaks, were seen to be infected by the disease. This sit-
uation places groups attempting to mobilize to combat the
disease at a disadvantage. Historically, disease suppression
efforts have attracted the most funding and governmental
support when they involve commercially important or
visually dominant tree species (Cannon and Worley 1980;
Anagnostakis 1997; Brasier and Buck 2001; Gottwald and
others 2002; Kinloch 2003; Schmidt 2003). It is possible
that if commercially valuable species such as redwood or
Douglas-ﬁr had been threatened in a substantial way by the
pathogen, management early on would have moved beyond
the community-based level discussed in this paper. Seen in
this light, COMTF, as a group advocating for the preser-
vation of the tanoak resource, has little inﬂuence relative to
groups ﬁghting diseases that affect more valuable plants.
This is why it has been effective for COMTF to bring
speakers from the Kashia Reservation to training events
and conferences to relate tanoak’s importance to their
culture. Developing interactional capacity between local
groups is as important as developing it within them. In the
case of the Hoopa and Yurok tribes, the threat of Sudden
Oak Death has inspired the tribes to seek out cutting-edge
scientiﬁc techniques for pathogen detection. Taken toge-
ther with the Kashia’s effectiveness at educating the public
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demonstrate how a two-way ﬂow of information into and
out of communities can enhance overall disease manage-
ment efforts in a region or state.
Existing literature and the variety of experiences out-
lined in these case studies suggest that biological emer-
gencies such as wildﬁre or other disturbances have the
potential not only to test community bonds, but also to
strengthen them and develop increased community capac-
ity for dealing with environmental threats. In the case of
Sudden Oak Death, this has proven to be true at a larger
organizational scale: in response to a recent wave of oak
mortality in southern California caused by other pests, both
public ofﬁcials and private individuals referenced existing
resources and lines of communication originally created to
deal with Sudden Oak Death (Susan Frankel, USDA Forest
Service, personal communication, June 2009).
For communities already invaded by P. ramorum, the
management task has become dealing with disease impacts
(hazard tree removal, fuels reduction) and determining
effective techniques for long-term disease management on
a smaller scale. As scientists sought to begin developing
such techniques, the communities identiﬁed in these case
studies began to step up with in-kind contributions: prop-
erties to use as outdoor laboratories, staff and volunteer
time, intra-community educational efforts, and some funds
of their own. On quasi-public lands (e.g., Mid-Peninsula
Open Space District, Kashia Reservation, San Francisco
Public Utilities Commission), generalist natural resource
managers decided to take constructive action against the
problem even in the absence of scientiﬁcally tested solu-
tions. By developing collaborative relationships with
P. ramorum specialists, scientists, and educators, these
communities enlarged their capacities for action while
participating in a very applied brand of citizen science.
Conclusion
The decentralized management shown in the case studies
above has obvious potential to enhance community self-
empowerment. Centralized management, in both the forms
of imposed quarantines or trade restrictions and eradication
activities undertaken, risks sparking local conﬂict of the
kinds that Carroll and others (2006) mention. Some of this
local distrust of centralized management has manifested
itself in the case of Sudden Oak Death, when local groups
have expressed their fear that the costs of management are
more onerous than the consequences of leaving a forest
disease unmanaged. For example, in the case of P. ramo-
rum management in Humboldt County, one local land
manager, while generally supporting Sudden Oak Death
management activities involving removal of tanoak and
bay laurel trees, conﬁded that he feared a ‘‘destroy the
village to save it’’ outcome. Community-based manage-
ment gives each community the power to determine its own
cutoff points.
However, in an inversion of this, another kind of conﬂict
exists when a community would like to take strong action
but then realizes that it cannot inﬂuence the larger socio-
economic or biological factors that may be responsible for
the plant pathogen’s entry into the environment or its
persistence there. P. ramorum’s presence in California
wildlands and neighborhoods depends partly on human
activities such as the global trade in ornamental plants.
Disease spread could also potentially be mediated by
landscaping or arboricultural activities, recreation, and
movement of wood, soil, or other plant materials from area
to area. Many of these activities are important to regional
and national economies, and reconﬁguring them to dis-
courage plant pathogen movement (for example, by
changing protocols for trade in plants and plant propaga-
tion) is a task that goes well beyond the local scale in
length and complexity of negotiation and the number of
participants required to effect change. Even if regulations
are changed, enforcement may be impossible in a practical
sense, as in the case of ﬁrewood movement for commercial
sale inside California. Additionally, funding for disease
management efforts ﬂuctuates with the fortunes of regional
economies and governmental budgets, and forest health
tends to get less funding and attention compared to the
health of agricultural commodities. In this situation, the
community’s adroitness at engaging the political system is
again important.
This second kind of conﬂict is the one that has mani-
fested itself most often in the course of Sudden Oak Death
management in California, as local groups have generally
clamored for more guidance, help, and regulation rather
than less. Of course, had every group received all the
management help it wanted, it may be that many of them
would feel differently and the ﬁrst kind of conﬂict would
reassert itself. For example, in Brookings, Oregon, where
strong centralized disease management has been imposed,
a few local groups have at times expressed displeasure with
some of the consequences of that management (Weissman
2007).
Ultimately, local management can at most extend to
only a part of the landscape (Gass and others 2009). When
one local group’s decision to not act will affect other
groups, who should be empowered to serve as arbiter? The
overlapping interdependencies between individuals or
groups when it comes to pest issues can in many ways
resemble the issues around water and air quality. This
telescopes up even to the scale of federal government
management. For example, how is it possible to maximize
the forest protection mission of the USDA Forest Service
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working with importers of non-native plants and animals
through the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service? Effectively answering these vexed questions
would probably require revision, re-prioritization, and
re-writing of rules at a massive governmental level, to
include input from affected and interested parties across the
country on a variety of natural resources-related topics
such as trade in plants and forest products, watershed and
wildlife protection, local economies, and many others.
These heady questions are beyond the scope of an article
like this, but national, collaborative groups such as the
Continental Dialogue on Non-Native Forest Insects &
Diseases may provide a model for addressing these para-
doxes in the future. Simply writing an ‘‘Invasive Species
Act’’ (something that people working in pest management
sometimes call for) might not adequately accommodate
competing priorities, but might rather add another layer of
competing bureaucracy to already existing protective and
proscriptive laws. The depressing truth is that such an
effort, to be done properly, would require a level of
political will and sustained attention likely to be present
only in a prolonged period of economic prosperity—or of
obvious environmental emergency.
The case studies in this paper may be instructive for the
management of pest outbreaks in the future. While each
pest outbreak will follow a somewhat unique narrative
based on a number of factors, if we move beyond just an
understanding of the biological and ecological factors at
play to also consider the societal constraints, we may better
be able to manage and control the impacts of that event.
From the example of Sudden Oak Death, we can see the
large role that community characteristics can play in
determining which, if any, local management action may
be taken. We suggest that the three lessons outlined above
could potentially be incorporated into landscape-level
disease and pest control planning in the future. Similarly,
they could potentially be incorporated into efforts to pro-
vide informative models of the landscape-level spread of
disease-causing pathogens and pests, especially those
models that take the effects of various management
activities into account.
The former instance (incorporating these lessons into
landscape-level planning) would involve gathering socio-
logical, demographic, and political data about affected
communities at the beginning of a disease or pest outbreak,
at the same stage that other basic data about the disease or
pest are being gathered. Information about monetary
resources available to affected landowners or land manag-
ers could be integrated with information about the structure
and spatial scale of affected forests in the ‘‘neighborhood’’
and subjective characterizations of important community
values to obtain indices of vulnerability (as in Parkins and
McKendrick 2007), interactional capacity (as in Flint and
Luloff 2007), and other indicators that might guide inter-
ested outside facilitators, managers, and coordinators where
best to focus their efforts at helping those communities face
the environmental threat. This points to a need for research
into and development of such indices, especially ones that
could be developed from rapidly administered surveys or
interviews of citizens in affected areas.
Similarly, these three lessons could conceivably aid in
the development of more accurate models of pathogen or
pest spread across the landscape. Recent efforts to model
the spread of Sudden Oak Death have combined an eco-
logical niche-based approach, which predicts the likelihood
of pathogen persistence in the landscape based on its host
and climatic requirements, with a dispersal capability
approach, which takes account of the pathogen’s dispersal
methods and dispersal limitations (Meentemeyer and oth-
ers 2008). Additionally, scientists are working on incor-
porating the effects of various management decisions into
these models to provide land managers with realistic dis-
ease management scenarios that will enable them to com-
pare the virtual consequences of various management
decisions with each other (J Filipe and C Gilligan, Uni-
versity of Cambridge; R. Meentemeyer, University of
North Carolina-Charlotte; and D. Rizzo, University of
California-Davis, personal communication, February
2010). Incorporating the same sociological and demo-
graphic information described above into these models
could enhance prediction by providing at least crude esti-
mates of the likelihood of widescale versus small-scale
management action, the likely swiftness of management
action, or the likelihood of resistance to such action, in a
given area.
Along with these considerations, citizen science and
educational capacities need to be nurtured in order to build
more effective disease management efforts earlier in
affected communities, as Moser and others (2009)
emphasize. The non-professional and community coordi-
nation that has been stimulated by P. ramorum will
undoubtedly enable a better response to the next forest pest
to appear in California. When community capacity to
manage the natural environment is actively fostered,
communities can jump-start the process of dealing with
new pests while facilitating the scientiﬁc search for proven
control technologies. The value of this dynamic demon-
strates that community coordination and education are
worthy of sustained effort and ongoing cultivation and are
more than simply reactive adjuncts to research and man-
agement activities during new pest outbreaks.
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